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Ebola and other viral haemorrhagic fevers
Be prepared, with new guidance featuring old and well established principles
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The ongoing Ebola outbreak in West Africa is the largest and
most complicated that the world has even seen. Since it was
first identified in the forested regions of south eastern Guinea
in March,1 it has spread to Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria
and has now been declared a “public health emergency of
international concern” by the World Health Organization.2
Ebola virus is one of a group of zoonotic viruses that can cause
severe disease in humans.3-5 Viruses that cause viral
haemorrhagic fever include Lassa virus, Crimean-Congo
haemorrhagic fever virus, Marburg virus, and emerging ones
such as Lujo virus. These viruses are of particular public health
importance because of their ability to spread to carers and
healthcare workers, the often high case fatality rate, difficulties
in their rapid recognition, and the lack of effective specific
treatments.3-6
The current epidemic is caused by the Zaire strain of Ebola
virus, which has a mortality of 50-90% in endemic settings. No
licensed cure or vaccine is available, although research is in
progress to develop these and two American healthcare workers
are reported to have received an experimental monoclonal
antibody preparation after acquiring Ebola virus infection in
Liberia.7 The keys to case management are early recognition
and isolation of cases, use of personal protective equipment,
and the provision of supportive medical care to reduce
mortality.2 6
Guidance on management of viral haemorrhagic fever was
developed for UK healthcare professionals after a laboratory
acquired case of Ebola infection,8 and the first cases of Lassa
fever imported to the United Kingdom in the 1970s. The
guidance was revised by the Advisory Committee on Dangerous
Pathogens in 2012 and updated last month.9 10 Similar guidelines
are available in the United States4 and European countries,11 and
they differ in emphasis from those developed for use in resource
poor settings.6 Guidance and information for the British public
are also available in a range of reliable internet resources
including NHS Choices.12-14
Imported cases of viral haemorrhagic fever in the UK are rare
and patients are often healthcare workers, military personnel,
or others who work in rural environments.15 These diseases
differ from infections such as influenza or severe acute
respiratory syndrome because they are usually transmitted by
direct contact with blood or other body secretions rather than
being airborne. Also, patients with viral haemorrhagic fever are
not infectious until they develop symptoms. The likelihood of
epidemic transmission in Western settings, including to fellow
travellers on airplanes, is therefore low.
The initial clinical presentation is non-specific, so viral
haemorrhagic fever should be considered in any patient with a
fever or history of fever in the previous 24 hours who has
returned from an endemic area in the past 21 days (the longest
incubation period). Most febrile travellers returning from
endemic areas will have other infections, such as malaria, which
also need rapid diagnosis and management.16 Unfortunately, a
travel history is rarely elicited in most day to day consultations,
leading to delays in diagnosis and in the isolation of patients at
risk.17-19
The updated guidance is aimed at a range of clinicians, both
specialist and non-specialist. It includes flow diagrams, tables,
and technical appendices that offer clear advice on the
assessment of exposure risk, management of patients, and all
aspects of infection control. It links to the UK’s Imported Fever
Service,20 which can provide case specific advice on risk
assessment and rapid diagnostic testing to augment advice from
local infection specialists.
The guidance recommends that patients initially identified as
having a possible viral haemorrhagic fever should be isolated
until the results of specific investigations are obtained from
reference laboratories, which may take up to 24 hours. It is
important not to delay diagnosis and treatment of more common
diseases, such as malaria or typhoid, during this period. In the
past this has been a problem outside specialist centres,21 owing
to safety concerns associated with performing otherwise routine
blood tests in patients with a suspected viral haemorrhagic fever.
The updated guidance is welcome because it acknowledges that
it is safe to perform these tests locally to support clinical
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management while awaiting the results of specific diagnostic
tests.
To be fully effective the new guidance must be supported by
the training of medical, nursing, and laboratory staff in risk
assessment, universal precautions, and the use of personal
protective equipment. Follow-up of contacts of cases is essential
for infection containment. In the event that a patient tests
positive, specialist care is available in the UK through the high
level isolation unit, based at the Royal Free Hospital in London.
The unit can provide advice on safe care for high risk patients
and safe transfer, as well as taking over the management of
seriously ill patients in the tailor made facility. The UK has
specially equipped ambulances and trained staff to accomplish
such transfers when needed.
In summary, the risk of a traveller acquiring a viral
haemorrhagic fever and importing it to the UK is very small
but must be considered. The key message for healthcare
professionals is to take a travel history from all patients with
fever and perform a more specific risk assessment for patients
returning from areas endemic for these diseases, according to
the recently updated guidance. All frontline hospital doctors
and managers also make sure they can answer “yes” to the
following questions: have you considered that someone with
viral haemorrhagic fever could present to your facility? Do you
have a local protocol? If so, can you and your staff find it? And,
lastly, have you adequately trained your staff in the use of
personal protective equipment? If not, now is the time to do so.
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